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"To my mind epistemology
must result from three basic phenomena. The first is the collective
mental differentiation of men: people exist who can communicate with
each other, i.e., who think somehow similarly, belong, so to say, to the
same thought-group, and people exist who are completely unable to understand
each other and communicate with each other, as if the belong to different
thought-groups (thought-collectives). Scientist, philologist, theologian,
or cabbalist can perfectly communicate with each other within the limits
of their collectives, but the communication between a physicist and a philologist
is difficult, between a physicist and a theologian very difficult, and between
a physicist and a cabbalist or mystic impossible. The subject of conversation
does not play a decisive role, because on an apparently identical subject,
e.g., a certain disease or celestial phenomenon, a physicist will understand
a biologist, but will be unable to come to an understanding with a theologian,
or a gnostic. They will talk next to one another: they belong to a different
thought-collectives, they have other thought-styles.
What, for one of them, is important, even essential, is for another a side
issue, not worth discussing. What is obvious for one, is nonsensical for
the other. What is truth (or 'lofty truth') for one of them, is a 'base
invention' (or naive illusion) of another. Even after a few sentences, there
appears to be a specific feeling of strangeness, which signals the interlocutor,
which proves an affiliation with the identical thought-collective"
("The Problem of Epistemology" [1936], in R.S. Cohen and T. Schnelle
(eds.), Cognition and Fact - Materials on Ludwik Fleck, Dordrecht,
reidel, 1986, pp. 81-2).
"[...] the theory of though-styles
throws a specific light on the relation between 'reality' and 'cognition':
the chasm between 'nature' and 'culture' fades away because the cognitive
activity (note: the collective one, which creates a separate thought-style)
is not a unilateral action as, e.g., the figurative rendering of a certain
object, but consists in a bilateral interaction: The thought-style creates
reality, not in a different way from other products of culture and, at same
time, itself undergoes certain harmonious changes".
(Ib., p. 112).
"The thought-style
[...] is the result of the theoretical and practical education of the given
individual; in passing from teacher to pupil, it is a certain traditional
value which is subjected to a specific historical development and specific
sociological laws"
("Scientific Observation and Perception in General" [1935], in
R.S. Cohen and T. Schnelle (eds.), Cognition and Fact - Materials
on Ludwik Fleck, op. cit., p. 66.)
"There exist a certain
collective of men possessing a common thought-style. This style develops,
and is, at every stage, connected with its history. It creates a certain
definite readiness, imparts it by sociological methods to the members of
the collective, and dictates what and how these members do see"
(ib., p. 72)
"'To see' means: to
recreate a picture, at a suitable moment created by the mental collective
to which one belongs" [see also the keyword Scientific observation]
(ib., p. 78)
"The logical nature of the
structure is not the touchstone of science, since systematic error frequently
yelds views which are more logical. An inference from the fondamental elements
or elementary sentences is not the touchstone of science, since there exist
non such elements. What we will consider to be the basic elements depends
solely on our standpoint; similarly it depends on our standpoint wich of
two structures we have to consider to be identical. The consensus omnium
is not the touchstone of science, for ther is never a consensus omnium,
but only the agreement of 'our collective', and this also depends on false
cognition. Every thought-collective considers that the people who
do not belong to it are incompetent. Practical applicability is noy a touchstone,
for due the harmony of illusions even a false view is applicable. The alchemists'
gold allegedly did enrich many people, and even the cost of wars was paid
for by alchemist' gold.
The only touhstone of science is in the specific features of scientific
cognition; the historic singularity of theri development, the structure
of the relevant though-collectives, the characteristics of the scientific
though-style"
("Problems of the Science of Science" [1946], R.S. Cohen and T.
Schnelle (eds.), Cognition and Fact - Materials on Ludwik Fleck,
op. cit., p. 127).
"Now [...] in the era of
team cooperation [...] the communal nature of scientific cognition become
obvious. No more can cognition be comprehended as a function of two components
only, as a relation between the individual subject and the object. Every
cognition is a social act, not only when it actually requires cooperation,
because it is always based on knowledge and skill handed down from many
other. It is social, for during every lasting exchange of thoughts there
appear and grow ideas and standards which are not associated with any individul
author. A communal mode of thinking develops which binds all participiants,
and certainly determines every act of cognition. Therefore, cognition must
be considered as a function of three components: it is a relation between
the individual subject, the certain object and the given community of thinking
(Denkkollektiv) within the subject acts; it works only when
a certain style of thinking (Denkstil), originating in the
given community is used"
("Crisis in Science" [1960], in R.S. Cohen and T. Schnelle (eds.),
Cognition and Fact - Materials on Ludwik Fleck, op. cit., p.
154).
