# **Ontology-driven information systems**

#### **Ontology-Driven Information Systems**

- Every IS *has* its own ontology (either implicit or explicit)
- The ODIS perspective: *explicit* ontologies play a *central* role, driving *all* aspects and components of an IS
- Two (main) dimensions to assess the role of an explicit ontology:
  - temporal dimension: development time vs. run time
  - structural dimension: impact on the various IS components:
    - database component
    - application program
    - user interface

## **Temporal dimension:** *development time*

- Two scenarios:
  - A pre-existing ontology library containing domain and task ontologies as "main building blocks" to be adapted and rused
    - standard IS: the ontology content is *embedded* in the standard components
    - ODIS: an *application ontology* is built by specializing domain and task ontologies taken from the library
  - Only an *upper-level ontology* available: not building blocks, but *conceptual tools* (analogous to other CASE tools)
- Two kinds of development:
  - IS engineering
  - IS *re-engineering*

#### **Temporal dimension:** *run time*

- Ontology-*aware* IS: the IS just uses the ontology for some specific purpose
- Ontology-*driven* IS: the ontology is a *central componen*t of the IS, cooperating at run time towards its "higher" overall goal
- Important application: *inter-agent communication*

## Structural dimension: the database component

- Development time:
  - support to *requirement analysis and conceptual modelling* (integrated with lexical resources like WordNet)
  - development of a *global conceptual schema* (DB integration)
- Run time:
  - mediation-based approach to *information integration*
  - intensional queries

# Structural dimension: the user-interface component

- Development time:
  - Generation of *form-based interfaces* (constraints checking)
- Run time:
  - Support quering and browsing the ontology itself:
    - better understanding of the vocabulary
    - queries at the desired level of specificity
  - Vocabulary detaching:
    - user free to adopt his own NL terms (mapped after disambiguation to the IS vocabulary with the help of the ontology)

#### Structural dimension:

#### the application program component

- Development time:
  - Generation of the static part of a program (type structure)
  - Support to OO design
- Run time:
  - Explicit account of the *ontological commitment* of an application program
  - Increase of the *transparency* of application software

# The problem of primitives

#### The formal tools of ontological analysis

- Theory of Essence and Identity
- Theory of Parts (Mereology)
- Theory of Unity and Plurality
- Theory of Dependence
- Theory of Composition and Constitution
- Theory of Properties and Qualities

# The basis for a common ontology vocabulary

Idea of Chris Welty, IBM Watson Research Centre, while visiting our lab in 2000



#### **Formal Ontology**

- Theory of *formal distinctions and connections* within:
  - entities of the world, as we perceive it (*particulars*)
  - categories we use to talk about such entities (*universals*)
- Why *formal*?
  - Two meanings: *rigorous* and *general*
  - Formal logic: connections between truths neutral wrt truth
  - Formal ontology: connections between things neutral wrt *reality*
- NOTE: "represented in a formal language" is not enough for being formal in the above sense!
- (Analytic ontology may be a better term to avoid this confusion)



# Mereology as an example of formal ontological analysis

- Primitive: *proper part-of* relation (PP)
  - asymmetric
  - transitive
  - Pxy =<sub>def</sub> PPxy ∨ x=y
  - Oxy =<sub>def</sub>∃ z(Pzx ∧ Pzy)
- Axioms:

supplementation:PPxy  $\rightarrow \exists z \ (PPzy \land \neg Ozx)$ principle of sum: $\exists z \forall w \ (Owz \Leftrightarrow (Owx \lor Owy ))$ 

*extensionality:*  $x = y \Leftrightarrow \forall w(Pwx \Leftrightarrow Pwy)$ 

**Excluded models:** 



#### **A Violation of Supplementation Axiom**



Dov Dory, Words from pictures for dual-channel processing, *Communications of the ACM* 51, 2008

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# Sets and mereological sums

(note to the last lecture)

- Sets of concrete things are abstract
- Sums of concrete things are concrete!
- No analogous of membership relation and empty set for mereological sums

#### Part, Constitution, and Identity

• Parts not enough to make the whole: structure creates a new entity

- · Mereological extensionality is lost
- Constitution links the two entities
- Constitution is asymmetric (implies dependence)



# **Essence and Identity**

#### **Essential properties**

- For an individual
  - John must have a brain
  - John must be a human
  - John must be alive
- For a type
  - All human beings must have a brain
  - All human beings must be "a whole" (all of a piece)

#### Essential properties and rigidity

- Certain entities must have some properties in order to exist
  - John must have a brain
  - John must be a person.
- Certain properties are essential to *all* their instances (*being a person* vs. *being hard*).
- These properties are *rigid* Their extension is the same in all possible worlds. If an entity is ever an instance of a rigid property, it must necessarily be such.
- By the way, what's the meaning of *exist*?
  - Being an element of the domain of discourse
  - Being present *at a certain time* (or in a certain world...)

# **Formal Rigidity**



#### **Formal rigidity - variations**

• Takint actual existence into account:

$$\Box \forall x( \phi(x) \to \Box(E(x) \to \phi(x)) )$$

• Taking time and actual existence into account:

 $\Box \forall xt((E(x,t) \land \phi(x,t)) \rightarrow \Box \forall t'(E(x,t') \rightarrow \phi(x)))$ 

• Welty, C. and Andersen, W. Towards OntoClean 2.0: A framework for rigidity (Applied Ontology 1(1), 2006)

#### **Unity and Essence**

- Unity: is the collar part of my dog?
  - **Being a whole** is often a (very relevant) essential property
  - Dogs are *essential wholes*...



# Defining unity

A tentative formulation: x is a whole under a unifying relation U iff U is an equivalence relation that binds together all the parts of x, such that, necessarily

$$\mathsf{P}(y,x) \to (\mathsf{P}(z,x) \Leftrightarrow \mathsf{U}(y,z))$$

but not

```
\mathsf{U}(y,z) \nleftrightarrow \exists \mathsf{x}(\mathsf{P}(y,x) \land \mathsf{P}(z,x))
```

- P is the *part-of* relation
- U can be seen as a *generalized indirect connection*

#### **Unity Refined**

Problem: the unity relation may not link together all the parts (think of a family as a whole)

$$\begin{split} \delta_{U}(x) &=_{\mathrm{df}} U(x, x) & (x \text{ belongs to the domain of } U) \\ \mathsf{U}_{U}(x) &=_{\mathrm{df}} \Sigma_{\delta_{U}}(x) \land \forall y, z((\delta_{U}(y) \land \delta_{U}(z) \land P(y, x) \land P(z, x)) \to U(y, z)) \\ & (x \text{ is unified by } U) \\ \mathsf{W}_{U}(x) &=_{\mathrm{df}} Max_{\mathsf{U}_{U}}(x) & (x \text{ is a whole under } U) \end{split}$$

$$\Sigma_{\phi}(x) =_{\mathrm{df}} \forall y (P(y, x) \to \exists z (\phi(z) \land P(z, x) \land O(z, y)) \qquad (sum \ of \ \phi s)$$

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#### Kinds of Whole

- Depending on the **nature of the** *unifying relation*, we can distinguish:
  - **Topological wholes** (a piece of coal, a heap of coal)
  - *Morphological wholes* (a constellation)
  - Functional wholes (a hammer, a bikini)
  - **Social wholes** (a population)
- \* a whole can have *parts that are themselves wholes* (with a different unifying relation)

#### Unity and Plurality

- Ordinary objects: wholes or sums of wholes
  - Singular: **no wholes as proper parts**
  - Plural: sums of wholes
    - *Plural wholes* (the sum is *also a whole*)
    - Collections (the sum is not a whole)

## A note on pluralities: Instances vs. members

- Often we use the same names for classes and their *characteristic properties*
- John is a member of "Person"  $\Leftrightarrow$  Person(John)
- Tree#1 is a member of "TheBlackForest" ↔ TheBlackForest(Tree1) ??
  - violates usual intended interpretation of unary predicates: property shared by all instances of the corresponding class.
  - doesn't pass is-a test
- Membership is a relation between *individuals*

## Identity criteria

• Classic formulation:

 $\phi(\mathbf{x}) \land \phi(\mathbf{y}) \rightarrow (\rho(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) \Leftrightarrow \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{y})$ 

( $\phi$  carries the identity criterion  $\rho$ )

• Generalization:

 $\phi(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{t}) \land \phi(\mathbf{y}, \mathbf{t}') \rightarrow (\Gamma(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}, \mathbf{t}, \mathbf{t}') \Leftrightarrow \mathbf{x} = \mathbf{y})$ 

(synchronic: t = t'; diachronic:  $t \neq t'$ )

• In most cases,  $\Gamma$  is based on the *sameness* of certain *characteristic features*:

 $\Gamma(x,y,t,t') = \forall z (\chi(x,z,t) \land \chi(y,z,t'))$ 

- Non-triviality condition:
  - $\Gamma(x, y, t, t')$  must not contain an identity statement between x and y!

## From identity criteria to weak identity conditions

- Finding necessary and sufficient ICs for a given property may be very hard.
- In most cases, to apply the OntoClean methodology it is enough to detect whether a certain property P carries supplementary membership conditions (in addition to those logically implied by P itself)
- A property *P* carries an identity *condition C* if all its instances necessarily satisfy *C*, and *C* is not logically implied by *P*
- Typical example: having some essential parts or qualities



#### Sortals and other properties

- **Sortals** (horse, triangle, amount of matter, person, student...)
  - Carry identity conditions
  - Usually correspond to *nouns*
  - High organizational utility
- Non-sortals (red, big, old, decomposable, dependent...)
  - No identity
  - Usually correspond to *adjectives*
  - Span across different sortals
  - Limited organizational utility (but high semantic value)



#### What about our rocks?

- *Igneous rock, metamorphic rock, sedimentary rock* do supply identity conditions.
- Large rock, grey rock, pet rock DO NOT!
- Not all properties are the same...



#### Carrying vs. Supplying Identity

- **Supplying** identity (+O)
  - Carrying an IC (or relevant essential property) that doesn't hold for *all* directly subsuming properties
- *Carrying* identity (+I)
  - Not supplying identity, while being subsumed by a property that does.
- **Common sortal principle**: x=y -> there is a common sortal supplying their identity
- Theorem: only rigid properties supply identity



# **Identity, Countability, and Mass Nouns**

- Nouns vs. adjectives
- Countability implies identity
- The problem with mass nouns: does the viceversa hold?
  - Being [an amount of] water:
    - Uncountable if arbitrarily divisible (but still carries identity!)
    - Countable if we assume molecules
      - We do have criteria for distinguishing and counting water molecules
      - We do have criteria for distinguishing and counting sums of water molecules
      - [compare with "being a group of people"]
  - Being made of water:
    - if x and y are made of water, nothing helps us to decide whether they are identical or not
  - So, "Being an amount of water" is a sortal,"Being made of water" is not.

